A new approach to access and allocation in the Atlantic Canadian fishery by Dooley, Thomas



St. John's
A NEW APPROACH TO
ACCESS AND ALLOCATION
IN THE ATLANTIC CANADIAN FISHERY
by
©Thomas Dooley
A major report submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master ofMarine Studies
(Fisheries Resource Management)
School of Graduate Studies
Fisheries and Marine Institute
Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador
May, 2004
Newfoundland
ABSTRACT
The allocation ofharvesting rights to individuals or fishing companies is arguably the most
contentious issue facing fisheries management today. In Atlantic Canada it presents a major
challenge to the Department ofFisheries and Oceans (DFO), given the complexity of the fleet
structure and with several provincial and territorial jurisdictions involved. In an attempt to
partially meet this challenge the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans struck the Independent Panel
on Access Criteria (IPAC) in 2001. The Panel was mandated to find a solution to the decision
making criteria as it relates to access with regards to ranking or weighting and defining these
criteria. The IPAC final report was submitted to the Minister in March of 2002. While the report
did identify principles and criteria, it failed to address completely some of the outstanding and
fundamental problems associated with this complex issue.
This paper reviews the concept of access and allocation, documents past problems, assesses the
IPAC report and presents a model and process, complete with definitions and weighting, as a
framework for access and allocation of fisheries resources in Atlantic Canada.
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1.0 Introduction
During the past decade the fishery in Atlantic Canada has gone through a period of significant
change. Many of the groundfish stocks which had sustained fishing enterprises and communities
for the previous centuries collapsed, and have shown no signs of recovery (FRCC, 2003). While
there has been expansion in other sectors, particularly shellfish, the magnitude of these increases
in terms of availability of resources falls well short of the volumes harvested when groundfish
dominated the fishing industry. Both the Federal and Provincial governments, and the entire
fishing industry in Atlantic Canada, continue to grapple with low resource prospects in the
groundfish sector and the ongoing problem of capacity reduction in the harvesting and processing
sectors. The debate over access and allocation is often intense and has historically been the cause
of conflict between users and regions (Hanna, 1994; Hanna and Smith, 1992). Decisions become
even more crucial and debate more intense when there is little or no additional growth to allocate
(Kirby, 1982).
Canada's fisheries management and administration occur within a distinct legal framework. The
British North American Act (1867) gave Parliament exclusive authority over seacoast and inland
fisheries. Section 34 of the Fisheries Act (1985) grants broad authority to federal fishery
administration (DFO) for the proper management and control of the sea coast and inland
fisheries. The federal minister of fisheries, at his absolute discretion, may issue or cancel fishing
licences and thereby limit entry into fisheries and prescribe levels o~ effort (Steele et aI, 1992).
Such power is extraordinary within the Canadian system of government. As one former Minister
of Fisheries and Oceans reported to the Independent Panel on Access Criteria (IPAC), "this
absolute discretion confers a great deal ofpower on the Minister, but also an immense burden"
(IPAC, 2002).
Access to and allocation offish resources remains one of the most difficult and controversial
aspects of fisheries management in Canada and abroad (Caddy, 1996).
Historically, allocation offisheries resources reveals a decided lack ofsophistication.
From man's earliest existence... fish and game allocation was a function ofbrute force.
In recent times political strength has been substitutedfor physical strength. (Stroud et
al,l980).
In order to fully appreciate these issues one must first clearly understand the distinction between
access and allocation. The Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review, discussion document, "The
Management ofFisheries on Canada's Atlantic Coast" defines access as:
the opportunity to harvest or use a fisheries resource, generally permitted by licences or
leases granted by the Department ofFisheries and Oceans under the authority ofthe
Minister ofFisheries and Oceans. (DFO, 2001 p. 28).
and allocation as:
the amount or share ofa fisheries resource that is assigned or allowable catch that is
distributed or assigned by the Minister ofFisheries and Oceans to those permitted to
harvest the resource. (DFO, 2001 p.28).
Atlantic Canadian fisheries are diverse in species harvested, gear types used and areas fished.
They are pursued in the waters off the provinces of Newfoundland ~d Labrador, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Quebec and Prince Edward Island, as well as the newly established territory of
Nunavut. The fisheries have long-term economic importance to the region (Cashin, 1993). The
debate over access and allocation is compounded when more than one political jurisdiction is
involved (Harris, 1990).
It has been recognized for almost 50 years that the heart of the problem for managing fisheries
lies in the "common property" nature ofthe resource (Hardin, 1968; Parsons 1993; Caddy, 1996).
Governments around the world have responded to the problem of open access with limited entry
licencing to prevent the overexploitation characterized by open access (Townsend and Charles,
1997). The establishment of catch limits now cornmonly referred to as total allowable catch
(TAC) and limited entry have been used in Canada, in most fisheries, since the early 1970s
(Parsons, 1993). These systems require decisions to be made by the regulatory agencies on
access and allocation of fish resources. Under the Canadian system, the process has become a
source of conflict between DFO and industry; a conflict which has frustrated and eroded progress
on key issues such as conservation and long term sustainability (Blackwood, 1996). Indeed,
Ministerial authority means that this conflict often lies on the Minister's desk, where it frequently
proves too great a burden (Kenchington, 1998).
The unrestricted use offish resources, open access, has become recognized as perhaps
the greatest threat to fishery sustainability. Indeed, the threat posed by open access was
the drivingforce behind recent United Nations agreements on straddling and highly
migratory fishery management. Both international and within nationaljurisdictions, it is
now accepted that, in the interest ofsustainability, not everyone can have access to the
fishery. The solution to open access conditions lies in specifying use rights, defining who
is allowed access to the fishery resources and under what conditions. However, the key
question arises: Who is in and who is out? (Charles, 1998).
2.0 Statement of the Research Problem
The access and allocation dilemma continues to preoccupy the fisheries management process in
Atlantic Canada. Decisions by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans over the years have
caused outrage in various areas of the region (Parsons, 1993). Some of the noted sources of
conflict surrounding the access and allocation process are:
There is a concern that the objectives or principles that govern allocations are
unclear. Factors such as adjacency and historical dependence are taken into
account, but there is no consistency in the application ofthese criteria.
The way that communities or individuals might wish to use fisheries resources can
change over time. For example, marine resources and habitats were once almost
exclusively usedfor commercialfishing, but today individuals and businesses are
seeking access to the resource for a variety ofother uses, including aquaculture,
recreational fishing and marine tourism. There are currently no mechanisms in
place for discussing and deciding on alternative uses ofthe resource, apart from
direct appeal to the Minister.
There are controversies about access and sharing arrangements throughout the
commercial fishery. In some cases, there is a concern about the perceived
fairness ofparticular allocations and/or sharing arrangements, and about their
duration. A few allocation arrangements are the focus ofcontinuing disputes
between different interests in the commercialfishery.
Because access to wealth in the form offishing opportunities is distributed at the
discretion ofthe Minister, it is not uncommonfor people to try to improve their
chances by lobbying the Minister and the Department. This generates criticism
that decision making is "political". The current process is seen as creating
winners and losers and gives rise to discontent and protests.
The perceived vulnerability ofthe allocation process to lobbying and the
perception that decisions are "political" undermine the integrity ofthe fisheries
management system. The legitimacy and credibility ofco-management processes
such as IFMPs are threatened by widespread cynicism about allocation decisions
(DFO, The Management of Fisheries on Canada's Atlantic Coast 2001 p. 28-29).
Historically, the discontent has centered around high profile fisheries like northern cod which
was allocated to many new users in the 1980s (Blackwood, 1996). More recently, decisions
surrounding the emergent ofa large shrimp resource off the coast ofNewfoundland and Labrador
has generated much controversy, particularly the allocation of 1500 tonnes ofnorthern shrimp in
NAPO Area 3L to a consortium ofPrince Edward Island (pEl) companies. This created such a
negative reaction in Newfoundland and Labrador that the Minister ofFisheries and Oceans
established a special panel to address the issue of resource access in Atlantic Canada.
The Independent Panel on Access Criteria (IPAC) was established by the Ministry ofFisheries
and Oceans in June of2001. The Panel was mandated to provide the Minister with
recommendations on decision-making criteria surrounding who should be granted access to a
commercial fishery that has undergone a substantial increase in resource abundance or to a
new/emerging fishery (IPAC, 2002).
3.0 Paper Organization
In order to review the IPAC report and develop a model for access and allocation decisions, an
understanding of the current process is necessary. This paper will review the current criteria used
for access and allocation decisions by international bodies and in Canada. The problems
associated with the application of this process in Atlantic Canada will be illustrated with
examples. This paper will also review the report of the Independent Panel on Access Criteria
(IPAC) to the Minister ofFisheries and Oceans and identify the short comings of the
recommendations in addressing the identified problems with access criteria. A proposed model
to guide future decisions on access and allocation in relation to Atlantic Canadian fisheries will
be presented as an alternative. Similar to the mandate of the IPAC, the proposed model is only
intended to deal with access to new or expanding fisheries. Past decisions on access and
allocation caused great debate, however, renewing the debate over these issues will not serve a
useful purpose. The go forward model will include defined criteria for access and a weighting of
these criteria to determine allocation.
4.0 Current Access and Allocation Criteria
4.1 Global Perspective:
The allocation of the world's marine resources has been a major issue for centuries and was the
underlying reason behind the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (parsons, 1993).
In 1983, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, recognizing the
dilemma of access and allocation decisions surrounding marine species, cited the following five
criteria for resource allocation:
1. Historic Performance - The historic participation ofthe various fleets should be taken
into account in allocating portions ofthe Total Allowable Catch (TAC).
2. Mobility - Artisanal and small boat fishers have limited range ofmobility and therefore
often provided preferential treatment in allocation.
3. Adjacency - Fishers who live closest to the area ofdistribution ofthe resource are given
preferential access and allocation.
4. Economic Dependency - The dependency ofvarious fleets on particular stock(s) is a
factor in allocation ofadditional resources.
5. Stability - It is desirable to have stability in allocation and access to allowfor planning
ofinvestment and to stabilize income and employment levels. (Troadec, 1983 p.58)
4.2 Regional Perspective
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) was established in 1978 as the regional
fisheries organization responsible for the management of fish stocks on the high seas of the
Northwest Atlantic in what is known as the NAFO Regulatory Area (NRA). NAFO has three
generally accepted access and allocation criteria: zonal attachment; coastal state consideration;
and catch history. These criteria are outlined in Article XI.4 of the NAFO Convention:
"Proposals adapted by the Commission for the allocation ofcatches in the Regulatory
Area shall take into account the interest ofthe Commission members whose vessels have
traditionally fished within that area and in the allocation ofcatches from the Grand Bank
and the Flemish Cap, Commission members shall give special consideration to the
Contracting Party whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on the fishing for
stocks related to those fishing banks and which has undertaken extensive efforts to ensure
the conservation ofsuch stocks through international action, in particular, by providing
surveillance and inspection ofinternational fisheries on these banks under an
international scheme ofjoint enforcement. " (NAFO, 2000 p.18).
These criteria are not well defined or weighted which has created difficulty in dealing with access
and allocation within NAFO. As a result a Working Group of the Fisheries Commission, which
is responsible for fisheries management in the NAFO Regulatory Area, was established in 1999.
Despite several meetings of the Working Group, little progress has been made in these key areas.
The Fisheries Commission in September of2002 asked the Working Group to reconvene and:
consider the issue ofallocatingfishing rights within NAFO and, ifnecessary,
develop appropriate options, taking into account the current allocation practice
within NAFO, the interests ofall Contracting Parties, the relevent provisions of
the NAFO Convention, previous reports ofthe Working Group on Allocation of
Fishing Rights to Contracting Parties ofNAFO and any other applicable
international agreement as well as the needfor NAFO to function effectively.
b. develop options whose terms are explicit and predictable for allocation to
Contracting Parties from current fisheries with NAFO TA Cs, fisheries previously
not subject to NAFO TACs, newfisheries, closedfisheries being reopened, and
fisheries for which fishing rights are or will be allocated in terms other than
quotas (e.g. effort limits). (NAFO, 2002).
4.3 National Perspective
In an attempt to reduce annual conflicts over access and allocation, Canada developed a set of
allocation principles in the early 1980s, and articulated them in the annual Groundfish
Management Plans.
Allocation offisheries resources will be on the basis ofequity taking into account
adjacency to the resource, the relative dependency ofcoastal communities and the
various fleet sectors upon a given resource and economic efficiency andfleet mobility
(Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan, 1984).
None of these criteria, however, have ever been clearly defined in terms of their application in
access or allocation decisions. This has lead some to conclude that these principles were not
always adhered to or applied consistently on a regional basis within Atlantic Canada
(Blackwood, 1996).
It is apparent that the policies enunciated by the Department ofFisheries and Oceans
and expressed in the Groundfish Management Plan's have been only words on paper to
be ignored at will. (Steele et ai, 1992).
Sharing principles for other species have also been identified in management plans. The 1997-
1999 Intragrated Northern Shrimp Management Plan identified the following sharing principles
for that resource:
Conservation ofthe resource is paramount.
Viability ofthe existing enterprises will not be jeopardized.
Adjacency will be respected, which means those who live closest to the resource
will have priority in fishing it.
Priority will be given to increasing participation ofaboriginal people in the
established commercial fishery.
Priority access will be given to inshore vessels less than 65' in length. Access by
midshore and offshore fleets will be consideredfor more northerly areas.
Existing licence holders will receive SOme ofthe increase in TACs.
Employment will be maximized in both the harvesting and processing sectors
where possible. (DFO, 1997 p.19).
Conservation, aboriginal fisheries for food, social and ceremonial purposes, adjacency to the
resource and community dependence appear to be the only dominant criteria in resource
allocation in Atlantic Canada. Beyond these general considerations, the criteria for allocating
access among various groups tend to be blurred (parsons, 1993).
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5.0 The Application of the Current Access and Allocation Criteria in Canada
The current application of the criteria in Canada, for both access and allocation decisions, often
creates controversy. There are several reasons for this, but three in particular stand out. A major
problem is that the criteria have never been defined. As previously stated, several criteria have
been cited in Canada, however, the definition of these criteria is lacking. There is currently no
accepted or consistent definition of adjacency in terms of fisheries in Atlantic Canada.
Furthermore, there is no reference period to define historic dependence or participation, while
other criteria, such as fairness and equity are difficult to define and are often open to subjective
interpretation.
Consistency of application and weighting are two other problem areas in the current application
of the criteria. A clear example of inconsistent application and weighing of the same criteria can
be demonstrated from two decisions made by the Minster ofFisheries and Oceans in 2000.
5.1 Northern Shrimp in 3L
On June 15,2000 the Minister ofFisheries and Oceans announced that he was issuing a
temporary allocation of Northern shrimp in NAPO area 3L to a Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.)
Consortium, Polar Seafoods. The 3L shrimp fishery is an expansion of the northern shrimp
fishery, and because it is a straddling stock is managed by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization(NAPO). Canada had negotiated for 5,000 tonnes of a 6,000 tonne TAC during the
1999 NAPO Annual Meeting.
In terms of adjacency, Newfoundland and Labrador is the only Canadian province directly
contiguous to NAPO area 3L. The Minister granted 60 percent of the Canadian quota to interests
from this province, while P.B.I., which is not contiguous, had no shrimp fleet and no history of
fishing northern shrimp, received 30 percent of the Canadian allocation. Fleets from Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec, which fish shrimp immediately to the north, received the
remaining 10 percent.
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5.2 Northern Turbot in OA
Only two months later, on August 16,2000, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans announced a
new turbot fishery in NAFO Davis Strait (NAFO Area OA) for 2001. The NAFO Science
Council recommended an additional TAC be implemented for the offshore area of division OA +
lA with a catch ofup to 4,000 tonnes in 2001. This was an expansion ofthe existing northern
turbot fishery. The Minister announced that Nunavut, the only adjacent territory, would receive
all of the Canadian allocation of turbot in division OA. Fleets from Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia that fished turbot in division OB, immediately to the south, did not receive any access to
this resource. (See Appendix A and B for news releases on these decisions).
5.3 The Lack of Consistency and Transparency
The circumstances surrounding the 3L shrimp and OA turbot were quite similar. Both dealt with
new fisheries in areas where there was no doubt as to which province or territory was adjacent to
the resource. However, in terms of the turbot allocation, Nunavut received 100 percent ofthe
turbot quota, based primarily on the fact that they are adjacent to the resource, whereas,
Newfoundland and Labrador, the only adjacent province to 3L, received 60 percent of the
Canadian shrimp quota in 3L. In the case of 3L shrimp the fleets which fished the same species
immediately to the north received 10 percent, while in the case of OA turbot those fishing the
same species immediately to the south received 0 percent. These two decisions demonstrate how
the fundamental criteria can be applied and weighted inconsistently in what would have to be
considered two very similar situations.
Perhaps the decision to grant Nunavut 100% of the turbot quota in OA is related to their land
claims agreement or aboriginal rights, however, this was never articulated to the fishing industry
or other jurisdictions, leaving no alternative but to speculate as to the rational.
The decision to grant P.E.I. access to 3L shrimp also demonstrates the lack of clarity and
transparency which exists around access and allocation issues in Atlantic Canada.
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It is impossible to rationalize the decision to grant P.E.I. access, based on the sharing principles
described in the previous section (pages 9 and 10). P.E.I. is clearly not adjacent to NAFO
Division 3L. The allocation is harvested by an existing offshore operator, therefore it did not
recognize priority for the less than 65' sector, nor did it maximize employment. Although this
allocation would be fished by an existing operator, the access was granted to a new user not an
existing licence holder with no aboriginal people associated with this new user. Adding further
to the difficulty in justifying the decision based on stated DFO policy, was the fact that the
proposed access for PEl was generally opposed by the Northern Shrimp Advisory Committee
(Northern Shrimp Advisory Committee Minutes, 2000), yet access was provided and a 3 year
annual allocation of 1,500 tonnes was granted.
The purpose of this example is not to highlight whether or not it was right or wrong to grant PEl
access to Northern shrimp, but rather to illustrate the problems and difficulties that exist within
the current access and allocation process in Atlantic Canada.
The Northern shrimp case provided the most striking example the Panel encountered of
lack oftransparency in implementing access criteria. This lack oftransparency created a
perception ofaccess criteria being applied in a manner so inconsistent as to appear to be
capricious. (IPAC, 2002: p.25).
The impact of such an approach to management decisions is compounded as the fishing industry
is generally characterized by a high level of uncertainty and instabilIty by nature. Resources
often fluctuate between cycles of "boom and bust" and markets can be affected by many
uncontrollable circumstances or events. Sound resource management should strive, therefore, to
provide some stability in such an industry. The current access and allocation process, however,
appears to do just the opposite; further adding to the uncertainty surrounding the industry.
Ironically, the DFO report "A Discussion Document on Policy Direction and Principles" states
that it is important to establish clear and consistent rules and procedures for making allocation
decisions (DFO, 2001). All too often, allocation decisions among user groups in Canada are
13
made on the basis ofpolitical expediency rather than on a clear understanding of goals and
objectives (Harris, 1990).
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6.0 Independent Panel on Access Criteria
6.1 Establishment of IPAC
The reaction from the Newfoundland and Labrador government, industry and the general public
was so severe to the northern shrimp allocation to PEl, that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
established the Independent Panel on Access Criteria (IPAC) on June 28, 2001. The minister
mandated the Panel to find a solution to the following problem:
The current criteria that govern decision-making when providing access to a new or
additional entrants in a commercial fishery that has undergone substantial increase in
resource abundance or landed value, or in a new or emergingfishery (Phase III
Commercial Licenses), remain poorly defined. Furthermore, the relative ranking or
weight ofeach criterion in the decision-making process is largely unknown and the
process for making these decisions is unclear. (IPAC, 2002: p.l).
The IPAC interpreted its mandate to mean it must examine criteria for granting access to two
types of fisheries: new or emerging fisheries and established (commercial) fisheries experiencing
substantial increase in abundance and/or landed value. The Panel participated in two briefing
sessions in Ottawa and received volumes ofbackground reports and documents. From August
through October 2001, sixty-six consultation meetings were held throughout Atlantic Canada,
Nunuvut and Quebec. Those consulted included fisheries organizations, processors
organizations, employees of fish plants, unions, recreational fishing and aquaculture groups,
officials and ministers from provincial and territorial governments, DFO officials and
representatives ofAboriginal peoples (IPAC, 2002). Not surprisingly, IPAC was presented with
a wide range of views and opinions during the process. The final report was presented to the
Minister in March of2002.
6.2 IPAC Recommendations
The Panel recommended three overriding principles for access in the following order of priority:
1. Conservation
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2. Recognition of Aboriginal and Treaty rights
3. Equity
The Panel then went on to recommend four access criteria with the following ranking of
importance:
1. Conservation
2. Adjacency
3. Historical Dependence
4. Economic Viability.
While it is generally impossible to argue with conservation as underlying principle in any
fisheries management decisions, its use as an access criterion is less clear. The Panel proposed
the following definition of the conservation criterion:
The conservation criterion requires that decisions regarding access promote
conservation, not only ofdiscrete stocks, but offish habitat and the ecosystem as a whole.
The application ofthe criterion requires that priority be given to environmentally
responsible fishers engaging in sustainable practices, subject to verifiable assessment
based on past practice, susceptibility to effective monitoring, direct and indirect
contribution to the enhancement ofknowledge and other factors related to conservation.
In view ofthis preeminence as a principle underlying Canaqian fisheries management,
the conservation criterion should be applied to all access decisions independently ofany
other criteria which might also be appropriate (IPAC, 2002: p.Sl).
The Panel recognizes that the application of conservation as an explicit criterion requires a
judgement by the regulating body make access decisions. Such judgements of conservation will
often be difficult to justify in an industry often characterized by high levels of uncertainty
associated with the impacts ofvarious gear types and fishing practices. The Fisheries Resource
Conservation Council of Canada (FRCC) concluded that:
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There are many concerns, many possible problems, many things that can be done and
much that requires further work when considering how the activities ofharvesting
Canada's groundfish resources relate to the goals ofrational and sustainable use.
(FRCC, 1997: p. 24).
Clearly the recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights would have to be included in any access
and allocation process. Court decisions have clarified certain Aboriginal and treaty rights related
to access to the fisheries. Decisions will be made in a way that is consistent with the
constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights by section 35 of the
Constitutional Act, 1982 (DFO, 2004: p.5). The application of these rights therefore must take
precedent when dealing with access and allocation. How to apply these rights in terms of number
of participants and amount of resource is a very complicated issues and will not be discussed in
this paper. The process outline in the following pages is meant to apply after these obligations
are addressed.
The third overall principle IPAC promotes is equity on two levels. The first at a procedural level,
is for fair and consistent application of criteria through a decision making framework that is
open, transparent and accountable. Clearly, this is necessary to address some of the shortcomings
of the existing process. The use of equity at a substantive level without a clear definition may
not be as helpful in advancing the access process. Simply stating that resource access must not
be done in a way that creates excessive interpersonal or inter-regional disparities will again
require an interpretation by the decision making body as to what constitutes "excessive
disparity". An overriding principle which is key to access decisions should provide more clear
direction.
6.3 IPAC Definition of Criteria
The Panel put forward the following definitions of the three access criteria:
1. Adjacency
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The adjacency criterion requires that priority ofaccess should be granted to those who
are closest to the fishery resource in question. The adjacency criterion is based on the
explicit premise that those coastal fishing communities andfishers in the closest
proximity to a given fishery should gain the greatest benefit from it, and on the implicit
assumption that access based on adjacency will promote values oflocal stewardship and
local economic development. In the case ofnear-shore and inshore fisheries, and
sedentary species, the application ofadjacency as the sole criterion is most compelling.
However, as the fishery moves to the mid-shore and offshore, and as the species fished
become more highly migratory and mobile, adjacency as the only criterion for decisions
regarding access becomes harder to justifY. In such cases, adjacency cannot serve as the
exclusive criterion for granting access, but must be weighed along with other criteria,
including historic dependence, in particular. (IPAC, 2002: p.49-50)
2. Historic dependence
The historic dependence criterion requires that priority ofaccess be granted to fishers
who have historically participated in and relied upon a particular fishery, including
those who developed the fishery. Depending on the nature and history ofthe fishery, the
requisite period ofdependence can vary from a few years to many decades. The historic
dependence criterion is based on the premise that fishers who have historically fished a
particular stock should enjoy privileged access to that resource, to ensure their continued
economic stability and viability, as well as that ofthe coastal, communities from which
they come. The historic dependence criterion is most compelling when applied to a
particular species that has been fished over a significant period. When the reliance on a
stock is relatively recent, or when the historic dependence is to fishing waters or the
fishery generally rather than to a particular species, other criteria such as adjacency
may be more applicable. (IPAC, 2002: p.50)
3. Economic viability
The economic viability criterion requires that decisions regarding access promote, rather
than compromise, the economic viability ofexisting participants in a particular fishery,
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as well as that ofpotential new entrants to that fishery. The economic viability criterion
is based on the premise that decisions regarding access should contribute to the
economic resiliency and stability ofindividual fishers and ofthe fishing industry as a
whole. At the level ofthe fishing enterprise, economic viability focuses on factors such as
capacity to fish, ability to comply with last-in-jirst-out rules and sound business
planning. At a broader level, economic viability looks to factors such as relative
economic return and value-added to the fishery, as well as at stability ofemployment in
the processing sector and economic benefits to dependent coastal communities. Properly
applied, economic viability should complement other access criteria in ensuring an
economically and environmentally sustainable fishery (IPAC 2002: p.50-51).
6.4 Shortcomings of the IPAC Recommendations
The Panel concluded that it was impossible to provide more precise definitions which were
universally acceptable and applicable. The failure ofIPAC to provide clearly defined criteria
must be considered a disappointment. These nebulous definitions ofthe criteria leave room for
questions and interpretation and thus the necessary decision making framework to prevent many
of the disputes which surround access to Atlantic Canadian fisheries is not established.
The Panel's definition of adjacency, which states that as fisheries move to midshore and offshore
areas the adjacency principle (criterion) diminishes in importance, raises a number of questions.
At what point does a fishery move from the inshore to the midshore? How much does its
importance diminish and does it continue to diminish as fleets continue to move offshore? The
IPAC report offers no clarification to these very important questions. The fact that many
individual fish stocks, such as northern cod, migrate between the inshore and the offshore
(Harris, 1990; Blackwood, 1996) makes it even more difficult to apply the adjacency criterion as
defined by the IPAC for similar type stocks.
The IPAC report suggests that the historic dependence criterion is most compelling when applied
to a particular species that has been fished over a significant period. Failure to give any
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indication of what constitutes a "significant period" creates additional uncertainty. Such an
omission makes it difficult to know when and where to apply this criterion.
While it must be acknowledged that the IPAC was given a challenging issue, the Panel's failure
to provide clarity of definition to the recommended criteria is problematic. With the exception of
securing additional Aboriginal participation in Atlantic Canadian fisheries, it would appear that
the report's recommendations puts the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans where he has always
been, having to make a final decision without the benefit of a well defined framework when
facing conflicting arguments from various interest groups. Thus DFO will continue with the
process of "muddling through" (Krueger and Mitchell 1977; Blackwood, 1996). The remainder
of this paper will propose a model for access and allocation which will define the criteria and
provide a process framework.
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7.0 A New Model for Access and Allocation
7.1 Establishing the Criteria
The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) clearly uses adjacency as its first
criterion in establishing state boundaries at sea. The 12 mile territorial limit (Articles 3-16), the
24 mile contiguous zone (article 34) and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Articles 55-75)
were established based on waters adjacent to coastal states. The Federal Government has
promoted the use of adjacency extensively in Canada and other jurisdictions and cited it time
after time as a policy in domestic fisheries management. Almost every major task force and
panel which has examined fisheries management in Atlantic Canada has confirmed and
supported its use as a guiding principle for access and allocation. The following examples
illustrate this fact:
In general, and not with standing the fact that marine resources have been determined
constitutionally to be a common property resource, the principle ofadjacency has been
accepted by Canada and, indeed, by the international community (Harris, 1990: p. 105).
Those adjacent to the resource should have a priority for new access (DFO, 2001).
....certain fundamental principles underlie the sharing ofthe increase in the 1997
northern shrimp TAG. One ofthe most important is adjacency. (DFO, 1997).
The following are proposed as a list ofsocio-economic criteria to guide management of
the level and type ofparticipation in this fishery; the principle ofhistorical dependency
and adjacency should be continued. ... (Dunne, 1990: p.14).
This principle ensures that those living closest to the resource are the primary beneficiaries of
opportunities arising from these resources.
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Another criterion which is clearly accepted domestically and internationally is historical
participation. Those who have a history of landings in various fisheries should benefit if the
resources expand. This has been clearly demonstrated in section 4.0 (page 7), "Current Access
and Allocation Criteria". The following further identifies the principle of adjacency and
historical participation as fundamental access criteria in fisheries management:
There are... two general principles... The first one is in giving priority to those Canadian
fishermen who traditionally have depended on particular fish stocks for fishing. The
second one should be indicated as the principle ofpriority ofaccess to fisheries
resources to those closest or adjacent to these particular resources. (Ferguson, 1986).
Historical catches are the bases for which the European Commission allocates resources to it's
member states outside the sovereign inshore 12 mile limit ofparticular member states:
The allocation ofa quota is still subject to the principle ofrelative stability whereby total
allowable catches for any particular fishing area are distributed according to a fleet's
history offishing in that area. (Attwooll, 2001).
A third criterion which must be included as a fundamental principle for access and allocation is
community dependency. Commercial fishing can generate significant community dependence.
Historically, the settlement and survival of many coastal communities was linked to certain fish
stocks, particularly in respect to northern cod on the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador.
(Harris, 1990; Parsons, 1993; Blackwood, 1996). Allocations and access decisions in existing
fisheries should ensure, if possible, the viability of such communities. The Independent Review
of the State of the Northern Cod highlighted this point, and noted that Canada has officially
adapted a policy that would take this into account:
That Canada officially adopt a policy analogous to the Hague Preferences that would
take into account. . both ofthe principle contiguity and the vital needs ofparticular
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communities particularly dependent upon fishing and industries allied thereto. (Harris,
1990: p152).
The Task Force on Incomes and Adjustments in the Atlantic Canadian Fishery further linked
community and regional dependency with access:
The Task Force believes that coastal regions and communities with a strong historic role
in the development and exploitation ofcertain fish stocks should have some form of
priority access to those stocks. (Cashin, 1993: p.64).
7.2 Definition and Application of Criteria
Adjacency, historic participation and community dependency have evolved in Canada as access
and allocation criteria since the inception of Atlantic Groundfish Plans in the late 1970s.
(parsons, 1993)
In order to apply such criteria, however, they must be defined. As previously stated these
principles are commonly cited and accepted but yet they have not been defined in terms of
Canadian fisheries management.
Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines adjacency as "having a common endpoint or
border." The following proposed definition of adjacency, from a fisheries perspective, takes into
account this definition, as well as the geographic management units for various fish stocks in
Atlantic Canada.
When any border of a management unit is defined by a land area, that land area is
"adjacent" to the management unit. Where no border of a management unit is defined by
land, then the land area geographically closest to the management unit would be
considered to be in "proximity" to that management unit.
23
Conflict over access and allocation in Atlantic Canada often exists at the provincial level
(Parsons, 1993), therefore, this definition is used to determine which province(s)/territory is
adjacent to which management units. The NAFO areas are used as the groundfish management
units in Atlantic Canada (e.g.. 2J3KL cod; 4RST turbot). This application clearly determines
which provinces are adjacent to each NAFO areas and thus which are adjacent to each groundfish
stock managed within these areas.
Table 1. Provincially based Adjacency to NAFO Areas
NAFOArea Provincerrerritory with Adjacency
OA Nunavut
OB Nunavut
2G Newfoundland & Labrador
2H Newfoundland & Labrador
2J Newfoundland & Labrador
3K Newfoundland & Labrador
3L Newfoundland & Labrador
3Pn Newfoundland & Labrador
3Ps Newfoundland and Labrador
4R Newfoundland & Labrador
4S Quebec
4T Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick &
Prince Edward Island
4Vn Nova Scotia
4W Nova Scotia
4X Nova Scotia & New Brunswick
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Figure 1: NAFO Areas
All NAPO areas within Canadian waters, with the
exception of3N, 30 and 4Vs, have part of their
boundary defined by land. This leaves only NAPO _
areas 30, 3N and 4Vs with no province(s)/territory
being adjacent. The province which is
geographically closest, however, is easily
identified. Areas 3N and 30 are closest to
Newfoundland and Labrador, while 4Vs is
geographically closest to Nova Scotia. Although
these provinces are clearly closest, they can not be
considered adjacent according to the definition
presented on page 22. Given that there is an
overall objective for those closet to the resource to '
benefit then proximity to the resource has to be
therefore introduced, which will only to be applied
when adjacency does not exist.
recognized. A fourth criterion ofproximity, is
Table 2 Province(s)/Territories in Proximity to NAFO Areas
NAFOArea Province/Te~ritoryin Proximity
3N Newfoundland & Labrador
30 Newfoundland & Labrador
4Vs Nova Scotia
Many shellfish stocks are managed using species specific geographical units such as Shrimp
Fishing Areas (SFAs) or Crab Fishing Areas (CFAs). The application of the proposed definition
of adjacency and proximity would be applied to these areas in the exact same manner. Using
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northern shrimp as an example, Nunavut is
adjacent to SFA 0, SFA 2 and in proximity to
SFA 1; Quebec and Nunavut are adjacent to SFA
3; and Newfoundland and Labrador is adjacent to
SFAs 4-7 (See Figure 2).
Now that the criteria of adjacency and proximity
have been defined, historical participation and
community dependence must also be defined if
they are to be used effectively and consistently as
criteria. Historical participation, for the purposes
of this model, entails those fleets with a history of
harvesting a particular stock. In order for a fleet to
claim historical participation it must demonstrate a
catch history in that fishery (landing levels and
time frame over which the involvement must take Figure 2: Shrimp Fishing Areas
place would have to be determined).
Community dependence has also been identified as a criterion for access and allocation. This is
reflective of those communities that have a history of processing resources from a particular
stock. This is not to suggest that quotas necessarily be granted to the6e communities. However,
allocations should be made so there is relative security for those individuals in the processing
sector of the industry, who have been historically dependent on certain resources share in the
benefits from the growth of these stocks. Alaska has used the concept of Community
Development Quotas (CDQ's) as a mechanism to ensure stability for coastal communities. This
program provides 7.5% of the Alaskan pollock quota directly to communities. The village
themselves would not to catch and process the pollack, but could enter into ventures with
existing companies who would buy the quota from the community corporation (Matsen,1993).
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Similar to adjacency, situations exist where historical participation and community dependence
cannot be determined, specifically in new fisheries. If there has not been a fishery, clearly no
group, community or fleet can claim historical participation or dependence. Under these
circumstances the process should assign to individuals and to groups the right to fish in certain
locations, generally based on long standing tradition ("customary usage"). This system, which
can provide relatively stable social support tools of fisheries management, are more prevalent
globally than is reflected in the fishery literature (Townsend and Charles, 1997). Therefore, a
fifth criterion should be used in the access and allocation process, historical attachment to an
area. Similar to historic participation, a fleet must be able to demonstrate a particular level of
activity to claim historic attachment to an area (again minimum level and qualifying time frame
would have to be determined).
This criteria is also supported by the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries which
states that:
States should appropriately protect the rights offishers andfishworkers, .... to secure
just livelihood, as well as preferential access, where appropriate, to traditional fishing
grounds and resources in the waters under their nationaljurisdiction. (FAO, 1995:
article 7.6.6).
The following five access criteria have now been identified and defined for use in the Access and
Allocation Model:
1. Adjacency
2. Proximity
3. Historical Participation in afishery
4. Community Dependence
5. Historical Attachment to an Area
These criteria take into account those closest to the resource, those who have traditionally fished
both the stock and the area, as well as those who have been involved in land based processing
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activity. It could easily be argued there are no other reasons to provide access to other groups in
a region such as Atlantic Canada, where an overcapacity exists in both the harvesting and
processing sectors (Cashin, 1993).
7.3 Types of Fisheries
Adjacency has been demonstrated to be the most widely accepted criterion for access and
allocation and its existence is not influenced by past policy decisions. Many have argued that
past decisions granting access to certain groups/fleets should not have occurred (Maloney, 1990;
Blackwood, 1996), yet these decisions has provided them with the opportunity to build
attachment, dependence and history to certain stocks, species or areas. These criteria, therefore,
should carry less weight. Given its importance and the fact adjacency can not disputed, if the
definition provided on page 22 is applied, fisheries where adjacency is determined to exist should
be treated differently from those where it is not. This is perhaps similar to the IPAC idea of
adjacency becoming less important as fisheries more offshore. The results of this application is
the following four types of fisheries in the model rather than the two types as identified by the
IPAC:
1. New Fishery/Adjacency
2. New FisherylNo Adjacency
3. Expanding Fishery/Adjacency
4. Expanding FisherylNo Adjacency
7.4 Weighting the Criteria
The DFO and its advisory bodies have considered a list of various criteria for access, but the
department has set no specific weight on the different elements, thus allowing for arguments on
allocation from all directions (Gough, 2001). The weighting of each criterion will vary
depending on which of the four types of fisheries is being considered. The easiest of these to
consider is a new fishery with adjacency. Obviously, in this type of fishery no form ofhistoric
participation, attachment or dependence exists, therefore adjacency can be used to determine
those with access. Specifically interests from the province(s)/territory deemed adjacent can be
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allocated one hundred percent of the available resource as nonadjacent interests have no history
or attachment. In fact, this would be consistent with the Nunavut allocation of OA turbot in
2000.
When adjacency cannot be detennined, the proximity criterion is applied. The model, however,
applies lower weighting to proximity than adjacency for reason already discussed. In a new
fishery with no adjacency, only the criteria of proximity and historical attachment to the area
can be applied. Obviously in this circumstance, the adjacency, historical participation and
community dependency criteria do not exist. The weighting, and hence the allocation is to be
split equally between the two criteria which do apply; proximity and historical attachment.
Those in the province deemed closest to the area receive fifty percent of the available resource
and those that have traditionally harvested the waters in which the new opportunity now exists
receive the other fifty percent. This could result in the granting of access to those from only one
province, if fleets from other provinces have no history in those particular waters.
The historically linked criteria come into play in both types of existing fishery. In expanding
existing fisheries with adjacency, adjacency remains the primary criterion for access and
allocation. A weighting of sixty percent of the additional available resource is to be allocated to
those adjacent. Given that in this type of fishery there is established historical participation and
community dependence, the remaining fourty percent is to be split equally between the existing
participants and community dependent interests, thereby ensuring that those currently attached to
a particular fishery, share in the benefits of the increase.
The fourth and final type of fishery which the model considers is an expanding existing fishery
with no adjacency. In this type of fishery, historical participation and community dependence
clearly exist, and therefore, accounts for the majority (80%) of the allocation of additional
available resource. An equal weighting (forty percent) is applied to these criterion. This provides
equal benefits to those who have traditionally been involved in the harvesting and processing of
the stock in question. The final 20% available in this fishery is applied based on the proximity
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criterion. Meaning that 20% of the increase is made available to other interests in the province
deemed closest to the resource.
7.5 The Model
An access and allocation model can be developed by using the types of fisheries, criteria and
weighting described above.
Access and Allocation Model
New Fishery
Expansion of Existing
Fishery
Adjacency
Adjacency (100%)
Adjacency(60%)
Historical
Participation(20%)
Community
Dependence(20%)
Non-Adjacency
Proximityrrhose
Closest(50%)
Historical Attachment to
the Area(50%)
Proximity/Those
Closest(20%)
Historical
Participation(40%)
Community
Dependence(40%)
Figure 3: Access and Allocation Model
7.6 The Advisory Process
A public consultation and advisory stage is necessary to complete the process. This would be
similar to the current advisory committee process which already exists. It is during this phase
that those deemed to have access, in accordance with the model, can discuss and recommend
specific fleet allocations. The model would determine who could be granted new access or
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additional allocation depending on the type of fishery being discussed and, therefore, who would
be involved in these discussions. The advantage of this approach is that it prevents what can be a
time consuming, and relatively unproductive, process under the current system; where those who
do not have access come to the advisory committees requesting access and those who do voice
their opposition to any new requests for access. During the 2001 northern shrimp meeting, the
chairman noted that 26 written requests for access were received and 13 verbal presentations
were made for new access to this resource (Northern Shrimp Advisory Committee Minutes,
2001). The model proposed in this paper would eliminate many of these requests up front,
thereby streamlining the advisory process.
The broad allocations are determined by the model. The increase to a fleet(s) already having
access receive a set percentage of the new or increasing allocation and may actually agree
amongst themselves on the sharing of that amount. If the existing fleets can not reach a
consensus on the split, then the Minister will make the final decision. The provinces/territories
with adjacency or proximity would also have a prescribed percentage of the available resource
depending on the type of fishery. Ifmore than one province/territory is deemed to be adjacent to
a fish stock, then the allocation to each province/territory based on these criteria is equal. For
example, if the stock management unit is 4RST, from Table 1 it is determined that Quebec, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador are all adjacent.
Therefore 20% of the allocation available under adjacency goes to each adjacent province.
Basically through this process a province/territory is either adjacent ?r not, the concept that one
province is more adjacent than another would not be entertained.
The provincial or territorial governments would playa lead role within the advisory process in
determine the access and allocations associated with the adjacency and proximity criteria. They
would propose to the advisory committee who would have access to that percentage. They may
choose to use the same criteria as the model, such as adjacency, for their recommendation. For
example, if the fishery occurs in 3L, the province, in this case Newfoundland and Labrador may
recommend fleets in 3L be granted access because they are adjacent.
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The province(s)/territory may, however, choose to promote other criteria such as mobility and
economic viability to address significant issues within the industry of that particular
province(s)/territory. A fleet that lacks the mobility to take advantage of opportunities in
offshore areas, may be granted access and allocation to an available resource in areas which they
can practically harvest. When the viability of a particular fleet hinges on access to a new
resource, or additional allocation of an existing resource then a compelling argument can be
made from within the adjacent province(s)/territory for access for that particular fleet.
Conversely, the province(s)/territory may simply recommend increases to the existing fleets
currently with access.
The advisory committee could support or not support the recommendation from the
province/territory, when it forwards it's advice. The final decision on any new entrants and their
allocation would still rest with the Minister ofFisheries and Oceans. The Minister, however,
could only grant access or allocation to any interest which qualifies through the model for that
particular type of fishery.
7.7 Examples of How the Model Works
The following are examples ofhow the model and advisory process would work using different
types of fisheries and circumstances which exist in Atlantic Canada.
Example 1 3NOPs 4VWX SZ - Atlantic Halibut.
The Atlantic halibut stock in the southern waters of Atlantic Canada is widely distributed. The
management unit, therefore, includes the area 3NOPs4VWX5Z. Should a large increase in this
resource occur and additional access be contemplated, the proposed approach would proceed
according to the following steps:
Step 1: Determine type of fishery
-+expandinglexisting fishery with adjacency.
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Step 2: Insert into the model for access and broad allocation:
-+Those adjacent 60%
-+Historical participants 20%
-+Community dependence 20%
Step 3: Determine adjacent province(s)/territory (from Table 1)
-+Newfoundland and Labrador (3Ps)
-+Nova Scotia (4WX)
-+New Brunswick (4X)
Step 4: Determine the historical participants
-+Nova Scotia - inshore/midshore
-+Newfoundland and Labrador - inshore/offshore
-+New Brunswick- midshore
Step 5: Establish advisory committee
-+Province ofNewfoundland and Labrador
-+Province ofNova Scotia
-+Province ofNew Brunswick
-+Pleets who historically participate
-+Community groups with historic dependence
Step 6:
Step 7:
Recommendation from the advisory committee to Minister on the:
-+Allocation of the 20% increase to existing fleet
-+Allocation of the 20% increase to protect community dependence
-+Allocation of the 20% increase to each of the three adjacent provinces
Minister's Decision
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Example 2. Jellyfish - Gulf of St. Lawrence
A new fishery for jellyfish in the Gulf of S1. Lawrence develops. The distribution of the
stock covers the entire Gulf of S1. Lawrence (4RST). The model works as follows:
Step 1: Determine type of fishery
-tNew fishery with adjacency
Step 2: Insert into model for access and broad allocation:
-tThose Adjacent (100%)
Step 3: Determine who is adjacent
-tProvince of Newfoundland and Labrador (4R)
-tProvince of Nova Scotia (4T)
-tProvince ofNew Brunswick(4T)
-tProvince ofPrince Edward Island (4T)
-tProvince of Quebec (4ST)
Step 4: Determine broad allocation
-tEach of the five province would be allocated 20%
Step 5: Establish advisory committee
-tAll provinces with access
Step 6: Recommendation from advisory committee to the Minister on the:
-tAllocation of the 20% to each adjacent province.
Step 7: Minister's decision
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Example 3. 3Vs - Quahaug Fishery
A new fishery develops offshore in area 4Vs for Ocean Quahaugs. The model works as follows:
Step 1: Determine type of fishery
-+New fishery, no adjacency
Step 2: Insert into model for access and broad allocation:
-+Those closest/proximity (50%)
-+Those with historic attachment (50%)
Step 3: Determine province(s)/territory in proximity (from Table 2)
-+Nova Scotia
Step 4: Determine those with historic attachment to 4Vs
-+Nova Scotia inshore, midshore and offshore fleets
Step 5: Establish advisory committee
-+Province ofNova Scotia
-+Fleets with historic attachment
Step 6: Recommendation from advisory committee to Minister on:
-+Allocation of 50% to province with proximity
-+Allocation of 50% to fleets with historic attachment
Step 7: Minister's Decision
Example 4. Expansion of the offshore crab fishery in 3NQ.
There is a significant increase in the existing offshore crab resource in NAFO area 3NO.
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Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 5:
Step 6:
Step 7:
Determine type of fishery
-+Expanding existing fishery with no adjacency
Insert into model for access and broad allocation
-+Those in proximity (20%)
-+Historic participants (40%)
-+Community Dependency (40%)
Determine province(s)/territories in proximity (from Table 2)
-+Newfoundland and Labrador
Determine historical participants
-+Newfoundland inshore and midshore fleets
Determine where community dependency exists
-+With existing harvesters and processors only
Establish allocation advisory committee:
-+Province ofNewfoundland and Labrador
-+Current fleet with access
Recommendations from advisory committee to the Minister on:
-+Allocation of 40% to existing fleets
-+Allocation of 40% to protect dependent communities
-+Allocation of 20% to province in proximity
Minister's decision
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Final Decision by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
Recommendation on Specific Fleet Allocations
Advisory Committee
Determine Access and Broad Allocation
Insert into Model
Type of Fishery
Figure 4: Flow Chart of the Access and Allocation Decision-Making Process
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8.0 Discussion
8.1 Benefits of the Model
Providing access and allocating fish resources, or any resources for that matter, which provides
the opportunity for the accumulation ofwealth will never be easy. In a region like Atlantic
Canada, where some portions of the region are almost exclusively dependent on the fishery, the
process is that much more challenging. Further complicating the process is the complexity of the
fleet structure and the involvement of five provinces, and the emergence ofNunavut as a territory
with expanding fishing interests. Government, as the regulator, must strive to make the process
as simple, clear and transparent as possible. The current process is obviously lacking in all of
these characteristics.
Current decisions on access and allocation are often considered to be politically motivated
(Steele,1992; Parsons, 1993; Blackwood, 1996). The proposed approach outlined in the previous
section, would have the following advantages over the current process:
The criteria for access are identified and defined. more clearly than presented by the
IPAC. Ifcriteria are to be applied in a consistent and transparent way, they must be
defined. This is perhaps the biggest flaw in the current access and allocation process
today.
The model eliminates, up front, requests from those seeking access who do not meet
specific, well defined criteria. One of the most time consuming and unpleasant aspects of
the current advisory process in Atlantic Canada fisheries management is the access
debate. Quite often application is made without justification due mainly to the fact that
there is no mechanism to reject these proposals, except through a decision by the
Minister.
By identifying four types of fisheries where new access can be considered, and suggesting
specific criteria for each, the model has the flexibility to address different situations in a
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systematic way. Clearly, criteria and weighting have to be different for fisheries in which
a history exists, compared to new fisheries in which there is no fishing history.
Once the type of fishery is identified, "inserting" into the model ensures consistent
application of the criteria. The criteria for access in similar circumstances will always be
the same.
The access criteria have been weighted for the purpose of determining allocation
percentages. Similarly they will not change for similar types of fisheries.
There is a clear role for the provincial governments to play in recommending new access
and allocation within the province(s)/territory, when that province(s)/territory is deemed
to be adjacent or in proximity. The provincial governments have long been seeking a
meaningful role, beyond lobbyist, in fisheries management issues which occur within
their jurisdiction (Vardy, 1994).
The use of the model will assist in making the process less political. Only those who
meet the criteria outlined in the model can be granted access and the prescribed allocation
percentages must be followed.
There will be less controversy between provinces since the model determines the
allocation to each province on a percentage basis for fisheries in their waters.
The model determines that new access and allocation can be granted to interests from a
particular province or territory based on adjacency or proximity. The advisory committee
can recommend who receives this new access and allocation, however, the final decision
remains with the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, but these decisions must remain
within the framework of the model.
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8.2 Challenges for the Model
Due to the rather complex nature of the Atlantic Canadian fishery, there are some issues which
need to be dealt with prior to the implementation of this model. One such issue occurs when
dealing with the expansion of existing fisheries. In such fisheries a decision has to be made
regarding what constitutes a "substantial increase" to trigger the application of the model. Minor
increases which do not justify any changes to the current sharing arrangements could be dealt
with through the advisory process, however, determination ofwhen to introduce the model is a
key question.
There are alternatives for determining when new access should be considered. One possible
solution is a species approach. This would involve determining, for each major commercial
species, a percentage increase which would trigger the implementation of the model. For
example, for shrimp stocks, an increase in the TAC of 30 percent from the historical level could
result in application of the model. Such an approach could actually result in fewer demands for
large increases in TACs and thus the model acts as a conservation tool.
The difficulty ofusing the percent approach would be that in existing fisheries with small TACs,
the model could be triggered by small increases. Perhaps a more suitable approach for these
fisheries is to the establish of a threshold TAC for each existing commercial fishery, below
which no changes in current access and allocation occur. Once the threshold is achieved the
model is triggered to deal with access and allocation of the TAC above that threshold. A
federal/provincial working group could be tasked with establishing these threshold levels. This
type of arrangement was used in the 1970s and 1980s for access to Gulf of St. Lawrence redfish
for vessels outside the Gulf (Parsons, 1993).
In new fisheries with adjacency the model credits the adjacent province with 100% of any TAC
in this type of fishery. This could limit the potential for development or exploratory work by
fleets from other province(s)/territory, that may be interested in that resource. The DFO can deal
with thus situation through its existing Emerging Fisheries Policy. Development work could
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only proceed with the approval of the adjacent province(s)/territory. The province(s)/territory
may see some benefit to proceeding with the development work and agree to a certain percentage
being allocated to an interest outside that province, in exchange for proceeding with the
development activity.
A similar problem could arise in new fisheries with no adjacency. An allocation of ocean
quahaug to the inshore sector, for example, could result in lost opportunity as this fleet may not
have the interest nor the capability to harvest this resource. A number ofpossibilities exist to
deal with such situations. If the quahaug fishery is developed to the point where access and
allocation decisions are required then obviously the necessary exploratory, scientific and
experimental work has already occurred. The inshore could receive it's allocation and simply
transfer it to another sector, which is already actively involved in this particular fishery.
Alternatively, given the inshore has no history in this type of fishery, has not been involved in the
pre-commercial development of the fishery and appears to have neither the interest nor the
capability to harvest this resource, the Minister could grant this fleet's share of the allocation to
the sector which did the initial development work. This could only occur with the approval of
the fleets and provinces involved.
Another possibility is to allow a fleet, which was not involved in development but qualifies
through the model for access and allocation, a defined period of time to demonstrate an ability to
harvest this resource, prior to it being permanently transferred to an active fleet in the fishery.
Perhaps a combination of these three could work to resolve this situation. These types of issues
should be dealt with in an advisory stage prior to the implementation of the model into fisheries
management policy.
The model may not be applicable for access and allocation when it comes to small localized
fisheries for species such as whelk, sea urchins and seaweed. If a new fishery for such a species
were to develop, for example along the north shore ofP.E.!., the model would determine that all
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provinces adjacent to 4T be granted access, if 4T is the management unit. This would mean that
fleets from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec would also awarded access and allocation
which in tum could easily lead to overcapitalization and/or overexploitation. The management
units for these fisheries should be, and often are, geographically smaller than the NAFO areas, to
ensure that conservation of the resource remains the priority and goal of the process.
Pelagic species, particularly large pelagics such as tuna and swordfish, often create unique
difficulties when dealing with access and allocation. These species, due to their highly migratory
nature, are not managed by specific geographical units, but on an Atlantic-wide basis. The
migration tract of these species is generally well known in Atlantic Canada. Therefore,
adjacency or proximity would be based on the NAFO areas through which the fish travels.
The application of this model would require that the types of issues raised in this section be
discussed widely prior to it's implementation into the Canadian fisheries management system,
and where possible decisions made on how to proceed when such circumstances arise.
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9.0 Conclusion
Most resource allocation decisions appear to be based on subjective criteria rather than analytical
frameworks (Parsons, 1993). The Independent Panel on Access Criteria noted the "current
definition of access criteria is open to wide and divergent interpretation" and "the process of
decision making regarding access has often been characterized by a lack of transparency,
consistency and perceived fairness!" (IPAC, 2002: p.65). Clearly the current process
surrounding access and allocation is in desperate need of change.
The IPAC was given the opportunity to address this difficult issue. Unfortunately, while
acknowledging the importance of clarity of definition and consistency, the Panel found the
following conclusions inescapable:
Definitions ofthe traditional access criteria, regardless ofhow carefully crafted,
must necessarily retain a considerable degree ofelasticity.
No single criterion or set ofcriteria can automatically and uniformly be applied
to the many circumstances in which access issues arise.
It is impossible to assign weights to the various criteria that would be applicable
in all circumstances.
No single criterion, set ofcriteria or assigned ranking would be universally
acceptable (IPAC, 2002: p. 48-49).
As a result of these conclusions, IFAC failed to fully provide the necessary framework to address
several of the very issues it identified as problematic.
The approach presented in this paper addresses the issues identified as the major sources of
difficulty with the current access and allocation approach in Atlantic Canada, while at the same
time it strives to incorporate some of the existing mechanisms, such as the advisory process.
Perhaps, most importantly, it does not alter the ultimate decision making authority of the Federal
Minister ofFisheries and Oceans when it comes to granting new access and allocation of
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fisheries resources. Such decisions, however, must occur within an established framework which
provides the transparency and consistency that those involved in the management process are
seeking.
A clear and bindingfisheries policy is needed in any case to discourage politically-
expedient, short-term decisions and to provide industry with government's vision ofthe
fishery ofthe future as an aid to personal and business planning (Kenchington, 1998).
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NEWS RELEASE
NR-H~79E
DHALIWAL ANNOUNCES INCREASED TURBOT
ALLOCATION AND STAFF FOR NUNAVUT IN 2001
August 16, 2000
IQALUIT - The Honourable Herb Dhaliwal, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, today
announced that Nunavut will receive all of the canadian quota of turbot recommended
by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) Scientific Council in the Davis
Strait (Division OA) next year.
The Scientific Council has recommended an additional TAC be implemented for the
offshore area of Divisions OA+1A with a catch of up to 4,OOOt in 2001 (see attached
!I@Q). The quota for Division OA will be established separately from NAFO Division OB,
which is traditionally fished by Nunavut interests as well as fishermen from other
provinces. Turbot in Divisions OA and OB will be managed as separate units in 2001.
Since 1996, Nunavut interests have conducted an exploratory fishery in Division OA with
a maximum harvest level of 300 tonnes. This additional quota will permit the Nunavut to
expand the current exploratory fishery.
"I am very pleased to provide Nunavut fishers with increased fishing opportunities to
harvest turbot next year; Mr. Dhaliwal said. "This allocation will be over and above
current allocations to Nunavut interests in Division OB in 2001. The 5,500 tonnes, which
are available in the southem part of this area, will not be affected by this new quota nor
will the historical interests of the other parties who currently fish there."
Bilateral discussions with Greenland will be undertaken later this year to determine the
sharing arrangement of the 4,000t of turbot for Divisions OA and 1A for 2001. Sub-area
OA is in Canadian waters and 1A is in Greenland waters.
"Providing Nunavut with 100% of the Canadian allocation in OA next year will permit the
continuation of the exploratory fishery on an expanded basis," Mr. Dhaliwal added. "As
the NAFO Scientific Council has noted, the relationship between Greenland halibut in
both OA and 1A, and other areas of Sub-Area 0 and 1 is unknown and needs to be
thoroughly investigated."
Canada and Greenland are currently partnering a survey, to be completed in 2001, to
study the turbot biomass in the north. Information from the expanded exploratory fishery
and the survey will assist in determining the relationships of turbot in the various
Divisions in the north.
"With this new fishing opportunity, I am also pleased to announce a 25% increase in
DFO staff in Nunavut. The additional resources will contribute to the effectiveness of
DFO programs and initiatives, including the development of new and existing fisheries,"
Mr. Dhaliwal added. DFO staff levels in Nunavut will increase from 12 to 15 employees
in 2001.
http://sds-sdd.ncr.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/newsre1l2000/hq-ac79_e.htrn 1/22/2004
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Consistent with NAFO, a 5,0001 quota will be available to Canada within NAFO Division
'We have received 17 requests from all Atlantic provinces and Quebec for access to the
northem shrimp fishery," Mr. Dhaliwal said. "Dividing the benefits of a valuable resource
among competing interests is always controversial. I am satisfied that this is a fair and
reasonable distribution of a Canadian resource to all Canadian fishermen."
The scientific assessment for 2000 indicates that the stock in SFA 6 continues to be
healthy and abundant with good recruitment prospects; thus permitting a modest
increase in this area. In the remaining areas, the indices are generally favourable but
future prospects are uncertain; accordingly, there will be no change in quota levels for
the 2000 season.
Canada siteHelpContact Us
Since 1996. the abundance of northem shrimp and the value of the fishery have more
than doubled. TAC's have increased from 37,60Ot in 1996 to current levels in excess of
100,OOOt, enabling the addition of inshore fishers in Newfoundland and Quebec and
expanded opportunity to benefit from the wealth of this abundant resource. In 1999,
these fishers and the coastal communities in which they live shared in the total landed
value of the fishery of $280 million.
The overall TAC for 2000 will be increased to 110,052 tonnes (t) from 102,052t in 1999.
The TAC for Shrimp Fishery Area (SFA) 6 will be increased by 3,000t to 61,632t in
2000, while the TAC in the remainder of the SFAs will maintain their 1999 quotas.
Additional fishing opportunities will be available in Division 3L, in accordance with the
decision of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) to establish a quota of
6,00Ot. 5.0001 of which is for Canadian fishers and 1000t for other NAFO members
outside of 200 miles. The quotas respond to advice from the Northem Shrimp Advisory
Committee (NSAC).
"The northem shrimp biomass has been very high and stable over the past several
years and the fishery continues to be an abundant and lucrative one for Atlantic
Canadians," Mr. Dhaliwal said. "However, while the scientific evidence allows for a small
increase in quotas, current environmental conditions, such as warming water
temperatures, could lead to decline in abundance in the future. Therefore, we are taking
a cautious approach by modestly increasing the quota. We will be reviewing harvest
levels each year to ensure the sustainability of the resoul'ce for future generations."
OTTAWA - The Honourable Herb Dhaliwal, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, today
announced the new three year management plan (2000-2002) for the Northern Shrimp
fishery. This plan will replace the existing three year plan which expired in 1999, and is
highlighted by an 8.0001 increase in Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for 2000 which will
enable additional temporary access to the fishery.
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3L. The Minister has decided that it will be allocated as follows: 2,500t will be fished by
existing inshore licence holders and 1,0001 will go to offshore participants in the
northem shrimp fishery. The remaining 1,SOOt will be provided to a consortium of PEl
fishers and processors as a temporary northem shrimp allocation.
PEl Is the only Atlantic province without access to the northem shrimp fishery. AA
allocation of 1,500t will allow the PEl fishing industry to have access to this resource
and to harvest northem shrimp, for the first time ever, since the opening of this fishery in
1978. The allocation of 1,5001 to a consortium of PEl fishers and processors will provide
funds for professionalizatlon of fishers to build their capacity to take on a larger role for
the management of their fisheries. It will also provide funding to augment shellfish
research, which will benefit all Atlantic canada and Quebec. In addition, this allocation
will make funds available to processors to aid in market development and promotion of
PEl seafood products.
"Over the past 20 years, fishermen in all of the Atlantic provinces except PEl have
enjoyed the benefits of this very luaative fishery," Mr. Dhaliwal said. "This year, for the
first time since the opening of this fishery, PEl fishermen will also be able to enjoy some
of these benefits. Given that 20,000t of last year's total quota was not harvested.
providing temporary access to this resource to new entrants while abundance is high
makes sense."
With respect to SFA 6, principles adopted in the last three year plan for allocation of
temporary access to quota increases will again be applied in 2000. Of the 3,OOOt
increase in SFA 6, temporary allocation of 1,SOOt will be provided to the Innu Nation of
Labrador, a temporary allocation of 1,OOOt will be provided to Fogo Island Co-<>p and a
temporary SOOt allocation will be provided to adjacent inshore licence holders.
Therefore, all of the increase in SFA 6 is provided to adjacent fishermen or fishermen in
Newfoundland and Labrador. The 1.5001 allocation to the Innu Nation responds to their
long-standing request, which is s~rted by NSAC, for increased access to northem
shrimp. Currently, the Innu receive only 510t of the overall TAC.
As a result of the allocation of this 8.000t increase in 2000, Newfoundland will maintain
the 70% share of the harvest they received in 1999.
In accordance with the principles developed in consultation with industry in 1997.
access to the increased quota will be provided on a temporary basis. This ensures that
there will be no permanent increase in harvesting capacity. Should there be a need to
lower quota levels in the future, the removal of access privileges will be based on the
'ast in, first out" principle, as is the case in all fisheries. Since 1997, all new access has
been provided on a temporary basis.
As recommended by NSAC, allocations that are not caught will be reallocated only with
the agreement of the fleet involved. However, should large quantities of allocated
quotas remain uncaught. a meeting of NSAC may be convened in the fall to discuss
reallocation. In 1999, about 20,0001 of quota were left in trie water, including about
7,0001 of quota assigned to temporary entrants in SFA 6.
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